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Abstract: Trust relations are essential for effective interchanges in the financial markets. Investors 9 
(trustors), as well as other market participants, can only trust financial markets if they trust their 10 
auditors (trustees). Especially, auditors' assessment on the client’s financial condition and its 11 
ability to continue as a going concern is paramount to improving social capital and maintaining 12 
sustainable financial markets. Research shows that a going concern opinion may have immediate 13 
consequences for both the auditing profession and financial statement users. We utilize the 14 
Throughput Model to illustrate how different trust positions are aligned with a particular 15 
auditor’s decision-making pathway to enhance trust, distrust or no trust from the point of view of 16 
investors’ and creditors’. 17 
Keywords: trust; social capital; audit report; sustainable financial markets 18 
 19 
1. Introduction 20 
The main question posed in this paper inquires: Are financial information users’ decisions 21 
influenced by their trust in auditors’ opinions? Given the apparent relationship between auditors 22 
and stakeholders (such as creditors, investors, unions, regulators, interest groups), it seems 23 
paramount to understand in what manner trust can nurture or erode social capital when parties 24 
interact [1]. According to Putnam [2] (p. 167), social capital can be defined as "features of social 25 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 26 
coordinated action." Szczepankiewicz [3] (p. 319) argue that the value of social capital in 27 
organizations is rooted in mutual social relations and trust units, which thanks to it can achieve 28 
more social and economic benefits. Coleman [4] (p. 98) articulated that, "like other forms of capital and 29 
human capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form 30 
of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful to others."    31 
The primary goal of the accounting profession is to enhance social capital by honoring public 32 
trust. Specifically, auditors contribute to society by assessing the truth and fair view of their clients’ 33 
financial statements [5–7]. In honoring public trust, auditors should act as the guardians of third 34 
parties’ interests rather than evaluate the consequences of their opinions in their relationship with 35 
their clients.  36 
When suspicion arises that auditors are not providing reliable and relevant information to 37 
third parties, distrust may emerge [8]. Furthermore, if society believes that the auditor function is of 38 
little or no value, then trust can be eroded [9–11]. In this paper, we share the view that trusting and 39 
distrusting cannot be understood as the opposite ends of a continuum [8–12]. Accordingly, we 40 
argue that the very complexity of the trustworthiness in auditors’ function relies on simultaneous 41 
high levels of trust-distrust relations [8]. 42 
Although some previous research investigates the association between trust and reputation of 43 
different parties [13–15], research on the link between auditors and society is lacking [16, 17]. In this 44 
paper, we focus on auditors' going concern opinions, probably the hardest and more controversial 45 
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task for this profession [18]. A going concern opinion is a powerful warning signal that might 46 
negatively influence investors and other stakeholders in terms of credit re-allocation. However, 47 
previous literature shows that auditors face trust dilemmas and potential economic and 48 
non-economic incentives influencing their decisions, such as the possibility of being fired by their 49 
own clients [7].  50 
To illustrate this phenomenon, we utilize the Throughput Model [19–20] to demonstrate how 51 
different trust positions are aligned with a particular decision-making pathway to enhance trust, 52 
distrust or no trust. Particularly, we discuss six dominant trust positions taken from Kramer [21]: a 53 
rational choice, rule-based trust, category-based trust, third parties as conduits of trust, role-based 54 
trust, and history-based trust/dispositional-based trust, and apply them to the auditors' going 55 
concern opinion. Because of the essential role played by auditors, we argue that a better 56 
understanding of the aforementioned trust/distrust positions will contribute to improving social 57 
capital and maintaining sustainable financial markets. This is important, since financial 58 
sustainability is the foundation upon which both social and environmental sustainability rest [22]. 59 
The next section deals with trust definitions, followed by a section devoted to explaining the 60 
institutional trust nature between auditors and primary stakeholders, such as stockbrokers, 61 
shareholders, financial institutions, employees, and society. This section is followed by how the 62 
decision-making model, The Throughput Model, is related to the dominant determinants of six 63 
trust positions. Then, the case of the author’s opinion about the going concern evaluation and the 64 
six trust decision pathways are discussed. Lastly, we provide our conclusions and implications. 65 
2. Trust, Trustworthiness and the Going Concern Opinion 66 
2.1. Social Capital and Trust 67 
Trust is viewed in this paper as (1) a body of beliefs or expectations, and (2) a tendency to 68 
behave with those beliefs accordingly [23]. These beliefs or expectations have grown up due to 69 
often long-lived relationships, intense in nature when there may be a great depth to the 70 
relationships between the parties, or where there are frequent interactions between them; the 71 
parties may also be reciprocally interdependent, and bounded whether by law or contract, such that 72 
the parties have incentives to maintain their relationship [24–25]. 73 
Trust affects auditors’ positions within networks by influencing investment and credit 74 
decisions. However, distrust can also provoke negative effects, e.g., auditors’ clients not receiving 75 
financing in a timely manner, and hence going out of business [26–27]. Gambetta [28] also 76 
emphasizes that uncertainty can lead to distrust and less cooperation. Others [21] have suggested 77 
that individuals’ reactions, in term of defensiveness, may depend on the level of trustworthiness in 78 
a given relationship. That is, stakeholders, relying on auditors’ viewpoints, may experience 79 
difficulties when interpreting organizational information and values and, therefore, will find these 80 
less accurate, whereby an increased distortion of messages may result. Therefore, understanding 81 
trust and distrust relationships are required for effective problem-solving in organized capital 82 
markets worldwide [29]. When financial statement users rely on auditors’ opinions, they recognize 83 
their common interests and cooperative relations may take place [30]. 84 
Trustworthiness can be viewed as the underlying base that promotes an efficient solution to 85 
problems of coordinating expectations and interactions between individual actors [20, 31–33]. 86 
Figure 1 summarizes the connection between trust/distrust/no trust scenarios and social capital. In 87 
the trusting/distrusting situations, we differentiate three types of trustworthiness: incentive-based, 88 
normatively based, or psychologically based. Incentive-based trustworthiness refers to the 89 
incentives of the trusted person in order to act in accordance with that trust. Incentive-based trust is 90 
rooted in a precise alignment with the motivations and desires of the other party, i.e., encapsulated 91 
interest, allowing one to serves as an “agent” for the other and as a substitute for trades and other 92 
interpersonal relations [34]. The second type of trustworthiness relies on the use of standards, rules 93 
or abstract universal principles rooted in moral commitment autonomy under the social capital 94 
framework. The third type of trustworthiness relates to reasons of character or psychological 95 
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disposition towards problem-solving and decision making. Finally, there is also possible a “no 96 
trust” scenario, where trustworthiness is null and may provoke undesirable effects, such as 97 
negative market responses and absence of reliable and relevant information. 98 
 99 
Figure 1. Trust/Distrust/No Trust scenarios & Social capital. 100 
2.2. Auditors’ Going Concern Opinions 101 
As stated by Duska, “society has carved out a vital role for the independent auditor that is absolutely 102 
essential for the effective functioning of the economic system” [35] (p.21). In this way, the auditor’s 103 
opinion on their clients’ ability to continue in existence is an act to establish trust with stockbrokers, 104 
creditors, investors, employees, and society. That is, financial statement users need to know the 105 
possibility that an organization may go bankrupt and the auditor is expected to deliver such critical 106 
information [6, 36].  107 
The irony of this relationship is that an organization (client) hires the auditor to report to third 108 
parties whether the client is truthfully revealing the outcomes and status of its operations [24] (p. 109 
39). Furthermore, auditors’ going concern opinions are often associated with Type Error I (i.e., firms 110 
that receiving a going-concern opinion survive in the subsequent year) and Type Error II (i.e., firms 111 
that do not receive a going-concern opinion but subsequently going bankrupt) [37]. While auditors' 112 
opinions should be rooted in normative reasons, previous research indicates that their decisions are 113 
subject to several economic incentives and psychological biases [6–7]. Uncertainty appears to be an 114 
unavoidable feature of trust. However, if individuals are uncertain about the auditor’s opinion, 115 
they might as well refrain from trusting, and seek other less informational sources. This would 116 
result in an undesirable effect since auditors are supposed to be the guardian of public trust [35]. 117 
In the next section, the Throughput Model and its relation with dominant determinants of six 118 
trust positions are discussed. We then illustrate the six trust pathways with the case of the auditors’ 119 
going concern opinion, before we present the conclusions and implications of this paper. 120 
3. The Throughput Conceptual Model 121 
The Throughput Model technique has been widely used to explore different financial and 122 
social issues such as lending [38–39], CEO’s ethical reasoning [40–42], auditors’ decisions with 123 
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environmental risk information [6–7, 43–44], information processing [45] and sexual harassment 124 
[46].  125 
The Throughput Model decomposed the ethical decision- making process into four main 126 
stages, namely perception (P), information (I), judgment (J) and decision outcome (D) to isolate six 127 
predominant ethical pathways (see Figure 2). As shown in Figure 2, information is likely to affect 128 
the way an individual perceives a circumstance. But perception is also likely to influence how 129 
individuals rely on the information to be employed in the decision-making process. Therefore, 130 
under the Throughput Model lens, both perception and information are mutually dependent (see 131 
the double-ended arrow in Figure 2). 132 
 133 
Figure 2. Throughput Model. Source: Rodgers [16, 45]. 134 
The first processing stage (perception in Figure 2) involves the framing of an organization’s 135 
problem or a circumstance (P). For the auditing case, framing implies the risk being perceived by 136 
the auditor in the organization’s financial statements. An example of this framing is the auditor’s 137 
assessment of the client’s internal controls. When internal controls are robust, audit risk will be 138 
perceived as low compared to a client with a weak internal control system. 139 
An organization’s information (I) as portrayed by auditors’ viewpoint can influence trust 140 
relations. Wicks et al. [47] argued that trust “lowers agency and transaction costs…, promotes smooth 141 
and efficient market exchanges…, and improves organizations’ ability to adapt to complexity and change” (p. 142 
99). For example, John Morrissey, deputy chief accountant of the Securities and Exchange 143 
Commission stated that the enhanced rules of the Ethics Committee of the International Federation 144 
of Accountants “… are based on the need to maintain investors’ confidence and trust in the reported 145 
numbers, through the services of an auditor that will be perceived as objective and unbiased.” [48] (p. 2) 146 
The judgment stage (J) is critical in the auditor decision- making process. Both financial and 147 
non-financial information are compiled at the subconscious level to develop alternative solutions or 148 
courses of action by using compensatory or non-compensatory weighting methodologies [38, 49].  149 
The trust decision (D) is rooted in positive confidence in the trustworthiness one attributes to 150 
another party. Currall and Epstein [50] (p. 194) stated: "Therefore, trust arises from judgments we make 151 
about the likelihood that another party will behave in a trustworthy manner as well as assessments we make 152 
about the possible costs we will suffer if the other party turns out to be untrustworthy.” In this paper, we 153 
explore investors and stakeholders decision to trust or distrust auditors’ opinions. 154 
4. Six Dominant Trust Pathways 155 
Once we have decomposed the ethical decision- making process into its four main stages, we 156 
use the Throughput Model to conceptualize the dominant determinants of the above six dominant 157 
decision-making pathways: (1) rational choice-based trust, (2) rule-based trust, (3) category-based 158 
trust, (4) third parties as conduits of trust, (5) role-based trust, and (6) history-based 159 
trust/dispositional-based trust [40]. Although other alternative pathways are also possible, they do 160 
not do so as significantly as the dominant pathways. These dominant positions enhance or weaken 161 
social capital based on the situation or contextual framework (see Table 1 and Figure 2). 162 
Furthermore, these pathways can be divided into two broad categories: primary and secondary. (1) 163 
Rational choice, (2) rule-based trust, (3) category-based trust are three primary trust pathways since 164 
	
P
I
J D
Sustainability 2019, FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 18 
they either focus on perception (P) or evidence (I). Whereas, (4) third parties as conduits of trust, (5) 165 
role-based trust, and (6) history-based trust/dispositional-based trust are secondary since they 166 
include both “P” and “I” [38].  167 
Table 1. Trust Positions connected to Social Capital. 168 
 
 169 
P → D depicts the most direct pathway to a goal or decision choice from a perceptual 170 
point of view. That is individuals frame a problem based upon their experiences, training and 171 
education and make a decision choice. Moreover, perception and information are coherent, 172 
which is to say that incoming information is constantly updating perception similar to a 173 
Bayesian statistical approach. Trust as a rational choice indicates that people are typically stirred 174 
to behave in their self-interest [51]. In addition, trust decisions are expected to be comparable 175 
to other types of risky choice in that people are recognized to be motivated to make rational 176 
and efficient choices, thereby improving social capital between auditors and society. That is, in 177 
accordance with traditional economic models, individuals are assumed to take action to exploit 178 
expected gains or reduce expected losses from their dealings. This viewpoint comprises two 179 
primary components [52]. First, knowledge is contemplated, which drives a person to trust 180 
another person, place or thing. Second, it associates with the trusted person’s incentives to 181 
honor that trust. This particular kind of trust is predicated on a broad grasp of the other 182 
individual’s wants, needs, and desires; i.e., it is rooted in the encapsulated interest concept 183 
under the social capital framework. Consequently, this particular kind of trust permits one to 184 
act on behalf of (i.e., "agent") the other and replace the other individual in interpersonal 185 
dealings [34]. Hardin [52, p. 189] stated: “You can more confidently trust me if you know that 186 
my interest will induce me to live up to your expectations. Your trust then encapsulates my 187 
interests.” 188 
Investors and stakeholders see auditors as an expert “agent” who contributes to minimize 189 
expected losses or maximize expected gains in their transactions. If they are convinced that 190 
information focuses auditors on maximizing third parties’ interests, they are more likely to trust 191 
(distrust) them. This leads to the first proposition: 192 
P1: Auditors’ opinions on an organization’s information are trustworthy (untrustworthy) to the 193 
extent that they (do not) protect/maximize third parties’ interests. 194 
(2) P→ J→D illustrates rule-based trust and focuses on the use of standards or laws which are 195 
rooted in moral commitment autonomy under the social capital framework. In other words, rules 196 
hinge on the arrangement of the decision choice together with the relational behavior of the driver 197 
of the action. The underlying and interpersonal mechanisms of rules are to be expected to prompt 198 
# Trust Position Pathway Type Social Capital 
(1) Trust as a rational choice P → D primary Encapsulated interest 
(2) Rule-based trust P → J → D primary Moral Commitment Autonomy 
(3) Category-based trust I → J → D primary Psychological Disposition 
(4) Third parties as conduits of trust I → P → D secondary Psychological Disposition/Encapsulated interest 
(5) Role-based trust P → I → J → D secondary Psychological Disposition 
(6) History-based/dispositional trust I → P → J → D secondary Psychological Disposition/Moral Commitment Autonomy 
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perceived trust [53] (p. 88) and increase or decrease social capital. Hummels and Roosendaal [54] 199 
asserted that “way to deal with complexity is to draw up an extensive contract that specifies the rights and 200 
obligations of the contract partners and to decide on the penalties when one of the parties fails to meet its 201 
obligations.” P → J → D assumes that direct evidence influence from I is downplayed and a trust 202 
decision is formed through judgment. Evidence is just ignored due to lack of reliability and an 203 
individual forms a perception with small or no weights on information. Then, he or she assesses 204 
alternative scenarios based on perception to arrive at a trust decision.  205 
Currall and Epstein articulated that [50] (p. 196) "Because it involves such personal 206 
consequences, trust is a largely solitary decision. Under certain conditions, our decision to trust also 207 
may be influenced by what family or friends do or urge us to do. Indeed, it is common for us to be 208 
swayed to trust someone by what others tell us about him or her." Kant’s Categorical Imperative 209 
states [55] (p. 1) “if it was right for one person to take a given action then it must be right for all 210 
others to be encouraged to take that same action.” Currall and Epstein also stated that 211 
“Furthermore, although trust is an evidentiary decision, we may use family members’ or friends’ 212 
experience as a proxy for our own. And, because trust decisions are often made in the context of 213 
incomplete information, we may seek out the advice of others as a supplement to our own 214 
information.” [51] (p. 196). Individuals maintain a set of values that are either implicitly or explicitly 215 
understood.  Besides, philosophers, religious and non-profit organizations have emphasized and 216 
promoted ideal sets of ethical principle or rules [40]. Illustrations of accepted moral values or rules 217 
at the implementation stage comprise bylaws, spiritual dogmas, trust codes for specialized and 218 
licensed groups, such as auditors, and a code of conduct at the organizational level. This leads to 219 
the second proposition: 220 
P2 Society’s perception that auditors’ follow a higher (lower) level of standards (rules) than other 221 
market participants will result in a higher (lower) reliance on an organization’s information. 222 
(3) I → J → D depicts that category-based trust relies on commitment and collaboration rooted in 223 
group belongingness. Category-based trust may be extended broadly within psychological 224 
disposition under the social capital framework and may be reinforced by ceremonial and figurative 225 
actions [56] that underline cultural similarity [57]. However, collaboration can exist without trust 226 
[58]. Trust can also be viewed as a means of promoting cooperation when other methods may not 227 
work or be as efficient. People are more willing to assign positive characteristics relating to honesty, 228 
cooperativeness, and trust to individuals within a particular group [59]. On the other hand, if 229 
common characteristics are absent, distrust can arise when dealing with an ethical issue (e.g., the 230 
prisoners’ dilemma game) [52]. A game such as “prisoner dilemma” can be implemented to 231 
discover how cooperation between unrelated parties can develop by normal choice. For example, in 232 
this type of game, each participant can either “cooperate” (invest in a common good) or “not 233 
cooperate” (exploit the other’s investment). Institutional form may obtain acceptability predicated 234 
upon perceptual framing pertaining to the trust on behalf of authoritative powers. Powell and 235 
Dimaggio [60] argued that an institute is a respected source to the degree that its structure and 236 
procedures follow the decrees of established laws and beliefs. This leads to the third proposition: 237 
P3 More (fewer) market transactions occur when society believes that a trustworthy (distrustworthy) 238 
auditing professional was responsible for reporting habits of organizations. 239 
(4) I → P → D emphasizes the third parties as conduits of trust and supposes that individuals use 240 
themselves or people within close proximity to them as their foundation for delineating ethical 241 
standards in lawless settings thereby impacting on social capital. Third-party material assists to 242 
underpin prevailing relationships, enforcing one’s perception to be assured of his trust (or distrust) 243 
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in a person, place or thing. Furthermore, the study conducted by Labianca et al. [61] demonstrated 244 
that third parties might be pulled into damaging interpersonal exchanges. Hence, trust rest on the 245 
undeviating link amid two entities as opposed to their indirect links through third parties and the 246 
circumstances that the strong indirect links, which augment trust overturn their effect to generate 247 
distrust. The certainty may also be an illusion of whether or not the individual or the institution is 248 
trustworthy or not. Likewise, Blau [62] (p. 112-113) argued that trust progresses since social 249 
exchange involves unspecified obligations for which no binding contract can be written. 250 
Henceforth, trust is obligated to a swap deprived of a person knowing how the other individual 251 
will respond. This leads to the fourth proposition: 252 
P4 Bad (good) publicity of an organization will influence auditors to issue a negative (positive) 253 
opinion on an organization’s financial reporting.  254 
(5)P → I → J → D accentuates that role-based trust is knotted to recognized societal 255 
configurations, contingent on a person or organizational particular social capital features. This 256 
particular pathway suggests that a person’s perceptual problem framing will inspire the assembly 257 
and information kind to be exercised in analysis (i.e., judgment). In other words, a person is 258 
encouraged to act aptly (i.e., perception) that impacts upon the information compendium 259 
implemented to be evaluated (i.e., judgment) in advance of a trust decision choice. This viewpoint 260 
put forward that an ethically compelled person with suitable inspirations is more likely to 261 
understand what task should be accomplished than an ethically deficient person would do. 262 
Beauchamp and Bowie [63] (p. 39) advocated: “A person who simply follows rules of obligation and who 263 
otherwise exhibits no special moral character may not be trustworthy.” Simon [64] (p. 125) proceeded that 264 
the inclination to undertake an expert's decisions can happen through respect to the authorities’ 265 
administrative part and can be made “independently of judgments of the correctness or acceptability of 266 
the premise (of their decisions).” Likewise, Tyler and Degoey [65] maintained that people's 267 
assessments of organizational authority trust formed their readiness to receive the authorities’ 268 
actions as well as prompting a state of mind of commitment to follow institutional rules and laws. 269 
Besides, Fisher et al. [66] acclaimed that people are bound together by professional positions within 270 
the social order. The special trust relationship between society and its professions can reduce or 271 
eliminate harm or exacerbate problems that people are confronted with on a daily basis. This leads 272 
to proposition five: 273 
P5 Stakeholders are more (less) trusting when they view auditors as the guardians (agents of the 274 
organization) of reliable and relevant information for their decision-making purposes. 275 
(6) I → P → J → D illustrates the history-based trust and/or dispositional trust that is rooted in the 276 
personal experience of recurring exchanges. In addition, personal experiences are augmented by 277 
information sources, such as databases, records, archival files, etc.  278 
The historical-based/dispositional trust position takes into account the probability of others likely 279 
actions based on past and present information. For instance, contracts are inherently incomplete – 280 
all the contingencies in a transaction simply cannot be specified. In a long-standing association, 281 
exchange is at the center of this course of action. Through this process, organizational dealings are 282 
connected to the social setting where psychological issues interlink with economic matters in 283 
reaching a decision choice [67]. In the aggregate, the security and constancy of repeated 284 
give-and-take interactions permit learning [68] and stimulate trust [69]. This outlook epitomizes the 285 
final conceivable distinct manner for people’s decision-making based on information processing. 286 
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According to this pathway, a person evaluates the existing evidence (I), frames the issue (P), 287 
proceeds to assess the issue (J) to finally arrive at a decision (D) leading to some level of trust or 288 
distrust. This leads to the sixth and final proposition: 289 
P6 Auditors’ trustworthiness (distrustworthiness) is a function of how independent information can 290 
(cannot) influence their opinions regarding an organizations’ performance. 291 
5. Illustrating Six Trust Pathways: The Case of the Auditors’ Going Concern Opinion 292 
In this Section, we applied the Throughput Model and its six dominant trust/distrust positions 293 
in the discussion of auditors' going concern opinions. We illustrate these positions with several 294 
examples in Table 2. 295 
From a normative point of view, auditors should maintain an independent (trustworthiness) 296 
position in their decision-making process [7]. Investors’ reaction to a going concern opinion (i.e., a 297 
warning signal) for a client with strong financial distress could be based on trust as a rational choice 298 
pathway, P → D. This pathway suggests that evidence (I) is disregarded, and the decision is made 299 
without a significant assessment (J). In trusting as a rational choice, investors and other 300 
stakeholders are expected to behave in their own interest to make efficient and rational decisions 301 
(i.e., encapsulated interest under the social capital framework). That is, investors just trust an 302 
auditor’s opinion and then will decide whether or not to move their investment to other companies. 303 
In this regard, investors perceive that a qualified audit opinion (P) reflects a rational risk to keep 304 
their investment in the company. Thus, without looking for further information or making any 305 
evaluation of the company’s ability to survive, investors would trust auditors’ opinions moving 306 
their investment to other market opportunities (D).  307 
In this process, investors and stakeholders see auditors as an expert “agent” who contributes to 308 
minimize expected losses or maximize expected gains in their transactions [70]. Similarity, potential 309 
consumers that trust an auditor’s warning signal would decline to buy products of financially 310 
distressed companies [7, 71]. Other important trustors of the auditor's report are commercial 311 
bankers. To improve financial health, companies may try to get a loan from a bank institution. In 312 
this negotiation process, loan officers tend to reject requests for credit when auditors have disclosed 313 
concerns in their reports [72, 73].  314 
However, the reality is that the auditing market is highly competitive [5] and auditors might 315 
face economic incentives to avoid going concern opinions. Several research papers indicate the 316 
proportion of going concern opinions for financial distress firms is low [71, 74]. Therefore, despite 317 
the fact that the final goal of the auditing profession is to honor and protect public interests, 318 
economic factors, such as the fear to be dismissed, or the magnitude of audit and non-audit fees, 319 
may affect auditors’ independence [75‒76]. Audit fees and client size have been some of the 320 
indicators used by the empirical research to measure the association between clean audit reports 321 
and economic incentives [73, 77]. For example, investors, such as bankers and financial analysts, 322 
may rationally distrust a clean audit report when they perceive that the company has been attested 323 
for a long time by the same auditing firm (i.e., long term contracts). Another reason to distrust 324 
auditors' opinion is the so-called "opinion shopping," that is, when the company management fires 325 
the auditor after the receipt of a warning signal about its ability to survive and hires a new one who 326 
issues a clean audit report [78‒79]. Thus, investors and other users perceiving opinion shopping 327 
would distrust clean auditors’ opinions regarding firms that are financially distressed. Following 328 
this argument, financial statement users will distrust if they perceive that auditors are not 329 
protecting their interests when issuing clean reports for financially distressed firms. In this 330 
situation, distrust as a rational choice pathway, P → D, may explain investors and other third parties’ 331 
behavior.  332 
The rule-based trust, P → J → D, highlights auditors’ trust relations, whereby they issue their 333 
opinion based upon prescribed rules (i.e., moral commitment autonomy under the social capital 334 
framework). Rule-based trust describes much of the auditors’ explicit and tacit understandings with 335 
other individuals. Indeed, it is based on auditors and other parties’ common understandings of the 336 
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set of norms concomitant of proper behavior. For instance, auditors draw up a contract (P) based on 337 
the rules, that determine if the company abides by the rules (J), and decide (D) on whether to issue 338 
an opinion. From the rule-based trust pathway, investors may have confidence in auditors, a 339 
self-correcting profession which has reacted after the Enron and other financial scandals. For 340 
example, after the Enron-Arthur Andersen scandal, the American Institute of Certified Public 341 
Accountants (AICPA) has significantly updated its code of ethics. In addition, recent reforms, 342 
including mandatory audit tenure and the banning of non-audit services, have been executed after 343 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to enhance auditor independence. 344 
However, some authors have argued that compliance with externally imposed rules may not 345 
be construed that one is trustworthy [80‒81]. This argument is also supported by the so-called 346 
“strategy issue cycling” theory recently developed by Moore et al. [82] and Bazerman et al. [83] 347 
asserting that current accounting reforms, rather than overcome auditors’ ethical dilemmas, seem to 348 
hide the reluctance of the auditing profession to make changes in the system. Thus, more 349 
regulation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, may be interpreted as a set of temporary and illusory 350 
solutions to an unresolved problem. Here, the rule-based distrust, P → J → D, may help understand 351 
why investors distrust auditors' opinions within a robust legal system, which is more “apparent” 352 
than real [82‒83]. 353 
The category-based trust pathway, I → J → D, may explain why investors show a tendency to 354 
trust international auditing firms highly. In this regard, big audit firms are seen as a specialist in 355 
many sectors (i.e., banking, insurance, high-technology). That is, international audit firms might be 356 
categorized as more trustworthiness in comparison to national and regional firms and have strong 357 
incentives to protect their reputation in the global market [84]. Also, firms with higher international 358 
reputation can hire and retain the best professionals [85]. Following this argument, investors would 359 
tend to attribute positive characteristics, such as independence, reputation, industry knowledge, etc. 360 
(i.e., psychological disposition under the social capital framework), to international firms. For 361 
instance, a clean audit opinion for a company suffering from financial distress issued by a small 362 
audit firm would provoke a feeling of distrust. On the other hand, the category-based trust pathway 363 
would explain investors’ trust in the same unqualified opinion guarantee by a select few large audit 364 
firms.  365 
Auditors may be sensitive to third parties as conduits of trust (e.g., newspapers report on 366 
litigation), I → P → D, and hence the issuance of an auditor's opinion may alter trust relations with 367 
others (e.g., bankers, bondholders, etc.). For instance, a qualified audit report may provoke credit 368 
rating agencies to lower their recommendation (e.g., from “investment grade” to “junk”) [86-87]. 369 
Thus, third parties’ information (i.e., the financial press, financial analysts, credit rating agencies) (I) 370 
might serve to reinforce investors’ trustworthiness (P), and an auditor’s opinion would be 371 
trusted/distrusted (D). Furthermore, third parties as conduits of the distrust pathway are also useful to 372 
illustrate why Arthur Andersen lost its reputation and, consequently, most of its clients after the 373 
intense press coverage of the Enron scandal, where that auditing firm never issued a previous 374 
warning signal about the company’s financial health. 375 
From the role-based trust point of view P → I → J → D, an auditor’s decision to avoid a going 376 
concern opinion might be seen as a trustworthy behavior if the auditor takes into account the 377 
environmental conditions that affect a client's ability to survive. In deciding to issue a qualified 378 
audit report, auditors face the so-called "self-fulfilling prophecy effect", that is, a market belief that a 379 
going concern opinion will contribute to a client's failure due to its negative impact on creditors, 380 
investors, suppliers and customers who would lose their confidence in the company [6–7, 44, 73] 381 
[88‒89]. For instance, the issuance of a going concern opinion has been found to cause clients’ stock 382 
price declines [90] and reduce a loan officer’s willingness to approve a loan request [72, 73]. Then, 383 
the auditor’s decision of avoiding a going concern opinion (I) can be trusted (D) whether the 384 
investors believe there is still a chance for the company to recover its financial health (J) and 385 
perceive that the release of a warning signal will unnecessarily hasten users’ confidence in the client 386 
(P).  387 
388 
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Table 2.  Simultaneous Trust/Distrust Positions on Auditors’ Going Concern Opinions. 389 
Position 
Trustworthiness 
level 
Definition Examples 
A
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st
) 
Trust Investors and stakeholders 
see auditors as expert 
“agents” contributing to 
minimize expected losses or 
maximize expected gains in 
their transactions, whereby 
the issuance of a warning 
signal is interpreted as 
protecting investors and 
stakeholders’ interests 
 
- Loan officers tend to reject requests for 
credit when auditors have disclosed 
concerns in their reports. 
- Stockholders move their investment to 
other companies after the issuance of a 
warning signal. 
- Potential consumers that trust auditors 
may decline to buy products of companies 
receiving warning signals. 
- Suppliers may fear that the client will not 
be able to pay once a going concern 
opinion has been issued. 
Distrust Investors and stakeholders 
may perceive that auditors 
have strong economic 
incentives to avoid the 
issuance of a warning signal. 
Thus, they distrust auditors' 
clean opinions on the ability 
of their clients to continue in 
existence 
- The higher the size of the client, the lower 
the possibility to receive a going concern 
opinion. 
- Auditors are less prone to issue a going 
concern opinion for new clients and for 
those that they have been serving for 
several years (e.g., Arthur Andersen was 
auditing Enron for about sixteen years, 
KPMG was Xerox’s auditor for 
approximately 40 years, etc.). 
- Given the current highly competitive 
auditing market, the recent loss of audit 
clients appears to decrease future going 
concern opinions. 
- Only a few number of financially unhealthy 
firms receive a going concern opinion from 
their auditors. 
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Trust Investors and other 
stakeholders may see the 
auditing profession as ethical 
exemplary due to a rigorous 
normative rule or legal 
system function in force. Also, 
the auditing profession may 
be viewed as a self-correcting 
profession which has 
positively reacted after the 
Enron-Arthur Andersen 
episode and other recent 
financial scandals 
 
- The AICPA has significantly updated its 
code of ethics. 
- The SOX may have contributed to mitigate 
auditor economic motives as well as by 
properly regulating auditor independence. 
- The European Commission mandated 
mandatory audit firm rotation, banned 
most of non-audit services, and imposed a 
limitation on permitted non-audit services. 
Distrust Investors and other 
stakeholders perceive that the 
weak current legal system 
leads them to highly distrust 
auditors’ opinions (i.e., 
strategy issue cycling theory) 
- Contrary to the rule-based trust position, the 
SOX may be viewed as a set of inefficient 
rules and laws. 
- The AICPA might update its code of ethics 
just to maintain its status quo against 
public interest after resounding financial 
scandals. 
- The PCAOB still nixes mandatory auditor 
rotation due to the heavy resistance of 
corporate board members and large 
companies. 
C
at
eg
or
y-
ba
se
d 
(I
 →
 J 
→
 D
) 
(P
sy
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ol
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ic
al
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is
po
si
tio
n)
 
 
Trust Investors and other 
stakeholders highly trust 
auditors’ opinions from 
international accounting firms  
- In terms of a superior reputation, 
international auditing firms are viewed as 
high-status companies that convey more 
legitimacy than small audit firms. 
- High-status audit firms are considered as 
experts in many sectors, such as banking, 
insurance, and high technology. 
- International auditing firms have a 
superior ability to recruit, retain and 
motivate the very best professionals. 
Distrust Investors and other 
stakeholders tend to distrust 
auditors' opinions issued by 
small auditing firms. 
- Small audit firms have more economic 
incentives to be dependent on their clients.  
- Non-international accounting firms do not 
possess enough expertise to issue on-time 
warning signals regarding their client's risk 
of bankruptcy. 
Sustainability 2019, FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 18 
Th
ir
d 
pa
rt
ie
s 
as
 c
on
du
it
s 
of
 tr
us
t 
(I
 →
 P
 →
 D
) 
(P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
 D
is
po
si
tio
n/
En
ca
ps
ul
at
ed
 in
te
re
st
) 
 
Trust 
Investors and other 
stakeholders highly trust 
auditors’ opinions when 
media reports support their 
clients’ financial (either 
healthy or distressed) status 
- Negative news of the client in the press 
increases auditors’ propensity to issue 
going concern opinions. 
- Credit rating agencies scores affect 
auditors' understanding of their clients' 
financial status. 
Distrust 
Investors and stakeholders 
highly distrust on auditors 
involved in financial scandals 
and corruption cases 
- The Arthur Andersen dramatic collapse 
after the media coverage on the financial 
scandal of Enron, which, at the time, was 
one of the world's top accounting firms. 
- PricewaterhouseCoopers paid $175 million 
in 1998, as a result of a lawsuit due to its 
inappropriate way of examining the 
financial records of Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI). 
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Trust 
Investors and stakeholders 
may perceive auditors' 
decision to issue a clean audit 
opinion for a financially 
distressed client might be 
seen as a trustworthy 
behavior if the auditor takes 
into account the 
environmental conditions that 
affect client's ability to 
survive. 
- There is a market belief that suggests that a 
going concern opinion directly contributes 
to provoke the final bankruptcy of an 
already distressed client (i.e., going concern 
opinion serving as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy). For instance, many commercial 
banks reject firms’ request for financing 
when those firms have received a warning 
signal from their auditors. 
- Auditors’ fear of causing damage to their 
clients’ shareholders. Several research 
reports indicate that the issuance of a going 
concern opinion significantly reduces 
clients’ stock price. 
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Distrust 
Investors and stakeholders 
may perceive an auditor’s 
decision to issue a going 
concern opinion (clean 
opinion) for a financially 
distressed client like an 
untrustworthy behavior 
under a high (low) risk 
exposure auditing 
environment  
- In the light of the recent financial scandals, 
auditors fear they will lose their market 
reputation when involved in. Thus, 
investors may perceive that auditing firms, 
rather than improve their compliance with 
externally imposed rules (e.g., Sarbanes 
Oxley Act), have increased the likelihood to 
issue going concern opinions to protect 
their market reputation.  
- Many auditing firms use their audit report 
containing a going concern opinion as a 
shield for potential lawsuits. 
- In auditing environments with low 
litigation risk, such as the cases of Spain, 
Belgium, and Hong Kong, auditors may 
offer a high reluctance to alert investors. 
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Trust 
Investors and stakeholders 
may trust a clean audit 
opinion (warning signal) for a 
financially distressed client 
might as a trustworthy 
behavior if they perceive that 
available information 
dominates auditors’ decision 
- Auditors are in the best position to assess 
the going concern assumption due to their 
expertise and their privileged access to 
insider information. 
- After examining the financial information 
of a distressed client, the auditor must 
evaluate both management’s plans (i.e., 
forecasts, budgets) and abilities to conclude 
the firm’s risk of bankruptcy. 
 
Distrust 
Investors and stakeholders 
may perceive a clean audit 
opinion for a financially 
distressed client as an 
untrustworthy behavior if 
they perceive that auditors' 
decision may be 
unconsciously biased when 
processing independent 
information (e.g., Bazerman et 
al.'s moral seduction theory 
[79]) 
- Selective perception, escalation of commitment 
and discounting of information biases illustrate 
auditors’ unintended predisposition to 
reach their own interest even when they 
want to honor public trust. For instance, to 
preserve future quasi-rents (audit fees), 
auditors may be unintentionally reluctant 
to issue going concern opinions. 
 390 
However, under the role-based distrust pathway, the issuance of a going concern opinion may 391 
lead stakeholders to distrust auditors. In recent years, some accounting auditing firms have issued 392 
going-concern opinions for companies that eventually went bankrupt. As a result, most of the 393 
financial and non-financial press has repeatedly asked auditors the reasons why they did not issue 394 
on time going concern opinions. This situation has provoked a new high risk-litigation environment 395 
Sustainability 2019, FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 18 
in which investors and other stakeholders now have a higher tendency to sue auditors [91‒92]. 396 
Following this argument, the chance of being sued by stakeholders would lead auditors to perceive 397 
that the potential costs of alerting them can be significantly greater compared to issuing a clean 398 
audit opinion. 399 
Finally, the history-based trust and/or dispositional trust pathway, I → P → J → D, represents 400 
auditors’ trust relations given a sufficient amount of information in an attempt to behave in a 401 
normative way. This pathway assumes that evidence influences auditor’s perception in an 402 
“unbiased” manner leading. For example, the consideration of the feasibility of management's 403 
future plans can be critical information to avoid a going concern opinion [18]. Besides, the 404 
history-based distrust argument might explain why auditors’ psychological disposition may lead 405 
investors to distrust auditors’ role as vanguards. Moral seduction theory suggests that the unique 406 
complexity of the auditor-client relationship precipitates auditors’ unintended lack of professional 407 
skepticism. Thus, even the most open-minded and diligent of auditors may be unconsciously biased 408 
when processing information [6‒7, 82‒83]. 409 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 410 
A vast variety of social capital devices, including institutions, norms, and so forth, enable 411 
individuals/organizations to cooperate efficiently and effectively. In this paper, we propose the 412 
Throughput Model as an efficient mechanism to better understand why auditors may act in a 413 
manner that seems not to exploit social capital for positive results. Social capital augmented in a 414 
positive manner is ‘satisfactory' for civilization bestowing to the ethical sources of standard 415 
philosophy, not rendering to the moral aspects of a particular assemblage of people or culture. 416 
Beliefs about what is right, just and fair are possible influences on social capital. 417 
The Throughput Model can provide more insight on auditors’ and other professionals’ 418 
deliberations when they are confronted with the task of being the guardian of public trust. That is, 419 
the model posits six dominant decision pathways that can influence knowledge transfer from client 420 
and auditor informants effective enough to establish their trustworthiness [93]. We believe that 421 
understanding the complexity of auditor trustworthiness is paramount to improving social capital 422 
and maintaining sustainable financial markets [3-4, 94‒95]. 423 
Our research has important practical implications for auditors, auditees, and regulators. For 424 
instance, consider the long debate about imposing mandatory audit firm rotation to enhance 425 
auditor independence and, as a result, audit quality. On the one hand, trust can be enhance if 426 
regulators enforce mandatory audit firm rotation as an effective way to increase auditor 427 
independence when a long association with audit clients exists (rule-based trust). However, 428 
mandatory firm rotation may also create distrust since it is likely to result in a loss of client-specific 429 
knowledge (category-based distrust) [96]. Alternatively, regulators may consider to enhance trust by 430 
imposing joint audits, i.e., a team of two or more auditors sharing responsibility and providing a 431 
single audit report (rule-based trust) [97].     432 
Our study has limitations. First, we rely on a single decision-making model, namely the 433 
Throughput model, to illustrate how main financial statements users can trust auditors’ going 434 
concern opinions. Alternative models with a different conceptualization of trust antecedents, such 435 
as personality-based trust or cognition-based trust (i.e., built on first impressions), could be also 436 
useful to examine our research question [98]. Second, there are other important decisions made by 437 
auditors. For example, consider auditors’ opinion on their clients’ internal control systems. This 438 
remains as an important research question since the vast majority of public companies with clean 439 
internal control audit opinions announcing subsequent restatements continues to be very high, 440 
around 75 percent in 2015 [99]. Finally, while we have focused our analysis on main financial 441 
stakeholders, it is also possible that non-financial stakeholders, such as governments, the media, 442 
not-for-profit organizations, regulators, etc., may trust/distrust auditors’ opinions in a different 443 
manner.  444 
Future research can study whether a particular trust position, supported by a particular 445 
decision-making pathway, is more appropriate given a particular situation involving "trust." Also, 446 
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future research can explore which decision-making pathway can typify better relationships 447 
between organizations; their auditors and investors' trust positions; and ultimately the 448 
improvement of social capital for society at large. Finally, the model’s different pathways can allow 449 
us to understand better how trust is nurtured and eroded as different parties interact. 450 
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